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Abstract 
In this paper, we utilize stochastic frontier analysis to estimate the impact of the 
regulations and institutions on bank efficiency through analyzing 389 savings and 
commercial banks in 11 Asian countries during the period 2000-2012. We find that 
activity restriction, capital requirement, official supervisory and private monitoring 
have a positive impact on bank performance. Furthermore, a wholesome institutional 
environment with powerful government, low corruption and strict law can enhance 
bank inefficiency. Our results suggest that banking regulations can improve bank 
performance with high quality of the institutional environment.  
 
Key words: Bank efficiency, regulations, institutions. 
 
 
JEL Classification: G21, P34, P52. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
1 Business, Management Department, Jubilee Building, University of Sussex, Falmer BN1 9SL, UK;E-
mail: E.Mamatzakis@sussex.ac.uk, Phone; +44 1273 877286.   
2 Business, Management Department, Jubilee Building, University of Sussex, Falmer BN1 9SL, UK; 
E-mail: Wh56@sussex.ac.uk, Phone +44 07510858699. 
1	  
	  
1. Introduction 
    Recently, there have seen a significant increase in the number of financial 
regulations in the world and the standards for supervisions are more strict than it used 
to be, since the international financial crisis in 2007 brought huge destruction to 
financial markets. Thus, a large majority of countries strengthens regulations and 
supervisions on the banks' activities meanwhile Basel Committee efforts to modify 
new regulations have gained space. There is an extended that Barth et al., (2004) 
Pasiouras et al., (2009) and Demirgüç-Kunt et al (2008) analyze the effect of a range 
of regulations and supervisions related to bank performance, and also investigate the 
bank’s soundness. Similarly, Beck et al., (2006) examined the effect of regulations on 
the banking industry and particularly the impact of the crisis as well as risk. However, 
a consensus on how specific regulations influence bank performance under certain 
institutional environment has not been reached. Therefore, in this paper, we will fill a 
gap by examining the relationship between regulations, bank efficiency and 
institutions in Asia.  
 
With the spread of liberal ideology of the Washington consensus, many countries 
in East Asia, has been reducing restrictions on capital account transactions and 
barriers to entry of foreign financial institutions into local markets so as to expand 
financial services since 1990s. Nevertheless, during the 1997-1998 period, a huge 
number of Asian countries faced financial disasters and their national economies were 
hit hard. For example, Japanese lending and FDI to other Asian countries fell 
dramatically at that time. Therefore, these Asian countries were motivated by their 
desire to construct effective and stable financial system as well as international 
regulations in order to prevent future crises. After this financial disaster, Asian 
countries decreased restrictions for foreign institutions’ entry for the sake of 
improving economic recovery and development. Furthermore, major Asian countries 
opted for financial liberalization and monetary integration in East Asia. They made 
considerable progress in deregulation their domestic stock market and financial 
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sectors such as banks. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations is a good example 
for driving the economic boom and pursuing stable financial system. Similarly, China 
reduced restrictions for foreign banks' entry and enforced shareholding system in local 
banks step by step. Therefore, we select 11 Asian countries as our database which can 
represent almost whole Asian economic situation and bank performance.  
 
As trade liberalization and economic globalization in Asia, the progress focused 
on regulation and supervision is enhanced in order to ensure sustainable economic 
development. Obviously, banks which are main financial intermediaries particularly 
in transition countries bear the restrictions of regulation primarily. Prior studies, such 
as Bonin et al (2005), Berger et al (2006), Yildirim and Philippatos (2007), Brissimis 
et al (2008) and Mamatzakis et al (2008), put forward views that rigorous 
supervisions may benefit bank performance, but all of them focus on European 
countries. While a relatively low number of researches analyze the relationship 
between bank performance, regulations and institutions. Thus, this paper will answer 
the question whether regulations and institutions can bring impact on bank 
performance by placing the spotlight on the sample of Asian countries.  
 
The previous studies, like Bonin et al., (2005), Beck et al., (2006), Carbo et al., 
(2009), and Pasiouras et al., (2009), do provide some opinions for the relationship 
between regulations and bank performance but they have not reached a consensus and 
do not consider the impact of institutions. When analyzing data, we opt for stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA) rather than data development analysis (DEA), in contrast to 
the study of Barth et al., (2002), which mainly use financial ratios for evaluating bank 
performance.  
 
All in all, the purpose of this paper is to show how bank performance they are, 
through using the SFA model. Furthermore, it will further answer what the connection 
between regulations, bank performance and institutions is in Asian countries. Finally, 
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through applying the scientific research approach for estimating the relation, we can 
give some suggestions to improve the banking sector and to promote their 
performance in the future. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured along the following lines. Section 2 provides a 
brief literature review for the related studies. Section 3 discusses the methods used to 
estimate bank efficiency and to examine the relation between regulations, bank 
performance and institutions. Section 4 presents the explanatory variables used to 
investigate the relationship. Section 5 analyses the empirical results, Section 6 
eliminates endogenous problems and Section 7 concludes.  
2. Brief literature review 
2.1 Studies on Regulations 
    To begin with, we provide theoretical evidence to estimate whether the regulations 
related to Basel can improve bank performance by discussing early literatures. The 
studies closer to our paper are those of Beck et al., (2006) and Pasiouras et al., (2009). 
Their results indicate that appropriate financial regulation and supervision may 
enhance banking performance and ensure a stable financial system. The prudential 
regulations, according to their opinion, are deemed by policy marker to be an 
important tool to guarantee the soundness of the financial system and effectively 
promote banking performance. However, Barth et al., (2004) consider that the 
relationship between banking efficiency and supervisory power is not significant 
because high levels of non-performing loan leads to low level of governance. 
Moreover, they also indicate that there is no evidence that regulation can prevent 
banking crises even though regulation can improve supervision. Therefore, our study 
will further proof the positive effect of regulations on bank performance in order to 
make a consensus towards their connection.  
 
    This paper involves four regulatory variables activity restriction (ACTR), capital 
requirement (CAPR), power of the supervisory agency (SPR) and private monitoring 
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(PMON), whose impact on bank efficiency have not reached a consensus according to 
earlier studies. Therefore, our hypothesis is that whether the regulations of ACTR, 
CAPR, SPR and PMON can improve bank performance. It is obvious that Basel ? 
type regulation can affect aspects of a bank's performance, such as efficiency, 
soundness and risk-taking. Except the ACTR values, the specific regulations of 
concern in this paper relate to restrictions, including the three pillars of Basel ?, such 
as capital requirements (pillar 1), official supervisory power (pillar 2) and market 
discipline (pillar 3). Barth et al., (2004) and Demirgüç-Kunt et al (2008) find that 
banking performance and stability are influenced negatively by activity restrictions 
(ACTR) because banks would like to engage in a broad range of activities to generate 
more funds. Furthermore, banks may be allowed to consolidate on the exploitation of 
economies of scale and scope by giving fewer regulatory restrictions. However, 
Pasiouras et al., (2009) argue that if banks engage in diverse activities such as 
securities underwriting, real estate investment and insurance underwriting, it may 
create the conflicts of interest with their fundamental business. Additionally, less 
regulatory restrictions may lead to moral hazard problems so that managers are 
willing to exchange private information and conduct insider transactions. Therefore, 
our paper expects that activity restrictions can improve bank efficiency. 
 
    For the regulations of capital asset requirement, VanHoose (2007) argues that this 
standard of regulations may influence bank efficiency. First of all, restrictive capital 
requirements may affect the quality and quantity of lending because banks may have 
less deposit for making loans. Secondly, it will bring impact on the decision of banks 
in allocating their asset portfolios. Finally, it may affect the decision of banks for 
attacking their sources of funds and large requirements may also generate cost or 
opportunity cost to banks. Nevertheless, Pasiouras et al., (2009) indicate that 
restrictive capital requirement can lead to higher levels of bank capital, which can 
help banks to reduce risk on activities and cope with financial recession. 
Implementing activity restrictions for banks will influence banks to expand services 
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and profitability by hindering sources of funds. As a result, our hypothesis is that high 
level capital requirement can enhance bank efficiency by reducing the probability of 
the financial crisis.  
 
    Some literatures such as Djankov et al (2002), shows that the supervisory agencies' 
power (SPR) may have the negative influence on bank performance. Firstly, powerful 
supervisors may use their right to make benefit for themselves, such as attracting 
campaign donations and extracting bribes. By the contrast, Barth et al., (2004) and 
Pasiouras et al., (2009) suggest that supervisory agencies may help banks avoid the 
market crisis by effectively regulating and disciplining. Generally, private monitoring 
(PMON) may also bring negative impact on bank performance, for example, private 
monitoring may relate to corruption and hinder bank's operations. However, 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al (2008) find that the private monitoring may assist efficient 
corporate finance and improve the lending of banks. Thus we anticipate that powerful 
agency and private monitoring have a positive impact on bank performance. In brief, 
a consensus on the relationship between regulation and banking performance has not 
been reached and still exists different opinions in above literatures.   
 
2.2 Studies on institutions  
    Although above researches definitely discover the relationship between regulation 
and banking performance, the impact of quality of the institution is not considered. 
Our paper will consider the function of institutions such as governance effectiveness, 
control of corruption and rule of law, expecting that a sound quality of institutions 
may enhance bank performance. The recent studies of Barth et al., (2004), Beck et al., 
(2006) and Pasiouras et al., (2009) do estimate and compare bank performance to 
decide whether to lease restriction or implement regulation but they ignore the 
significant impact of quality of institutions. On the contrary, Delis (2012) discovers 
that quality of institutions is a critical character in shaping the relationship between 
financial reforms and bank performance, emphasizing that with advanced institutions, 
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financial liberalization policies can reduce the market power of banks in developed 
countries. It is not unreasonable that regulation which is one of financial policies as 
well, associates with institutions to play a role of the tide in financial market to raise 
and lower the banking ships. Similarly, early empirical studies such as Demirgüç-
Kunt et al (2008) support that better institutional quality at the country level decreases 
the probability for a country to experience banking crises.  
     
    In our paper, institutional variables such as governance effectiveness, rule of law 
and control of corruption, are treated as complements with regulation and supervision, 
due to these variables can further embody the effect of regulation on bank 
performance. In a word, the advanced institutional characteristics are important 
prerequisites for regulations to have a strong impact on bank performance.    
 
2.3 Studies on Bank Performance  
    Our study relates to some literatures which estimates the performance of banks. For 
example, the study of Brissimis et al (2008) examines bank performance by 
investigating efficiency, productivity growth and net interest margin, and mainly 
focuses on impact of banking sector reform among European countries. Similarly, 
Delis et al (2011) also analyses banking performance through estimating the total 
factor productivity growth, but the aim of Brissimis et al (2008) is to examine whether 
banking industry reform influences banking efficiency. Furthermore, other studies 
also contribute to the analysis of banking performance, but all of them choose EU 
member as an object, such as exploring the impact of ownership and privatization on 
bank efficiency (Bonin et al 2005 and Berger et al 2006), and efficiency convergence 
(Mamatzakis et al 2008). It is obvious that analysis of banking performance related to 
regulation is an original field for us to explore, in terms of increase of Asian economic 
status.  
  
    On the basis of Pasiouras (2008) result, he combines regulation and supervision 
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measures to estimate technical efficiency of banks. Similarly, Barth et al (2004) uses 
an approach of data development analysis to observe banks operation and concludes 
that strict supervision and capital reserve standards may be affected by banks’ 
technical efficiency. However, Pasiouras et al (2009) indicates that cost efficiency is a 
wider concept than technical efficiency because it refers to both technical and 
allocative efficiency. Meanwhile, he also suggests that the method of stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA) is better than the approach of data development analysis 
(DEA), due to it can allow us to distinguish between inefficiency and other stochastic 
shocks in the estimation of efficiency scores. In addition to this, our sample selects 
panel data rather than cross-section data, which is more suitable for the efficiency 
frontier method. When compared to these studies Pasiouras et al (2006) and 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al (2008) which mainly employ general methods and financial ratio 
as indicators of performance, we estimate bank efficiency by applying the efficient 
frontier method. The reason why the efficient frontier approach is superior is that it 
can simultaneously account for relevant inputs and outputs of a bank, as well as for 
differences in the input prices (Pasiouras et al 2009).  
3. Data description 
3.1 Examination of inefficiency 
3.1.1 Inputs-Outputs    
For estimating bank efficiency, we use data on the bank-level variables from 
BankScope and select the information from 11 Asian countries on closing to 389 
commercial and saving banks. In terms of the time span of the database, we coverage 
data as comprehensive as possible for each country, country-specific variables are 
available for researching. We use the data from the 2000-2012 periods and all of them 
are reported in $US. Since applying intermediation approach, we will use two inputs 
and two output variables to examine bank efficiency. As above-mentioned, inputs 
include price of labor that is calculated by personnel expense, and price of financial 
capital that is measured by the total interest expense. Personnel expense can reflect 
the labor cost while interest expense to interest bearing funds can represent the 
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financial leverage. Equity is utilized as fixed netput, and we use GDP per capital as a 
control variable to distinguish each country's economy. Table 1 presents the mean 
values for estimating bank inefficiency and there have 2398 observations.   
Notes: The table reports summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum) for the variables used in 
estimating bank inefficiency. Units of the variables are as follow: GDP per capital; Total cost, Net loan, other earning assets, 
equity is in $ millions expressed; price of financial capital and the price of labor are ratios.  
  
3.2 Determinant of inefficiency 
3.2.1 Regulatory variables  
Table 2           
Summary statistics of the variables used in determining bank inefficiency 
 
Variable               Mean         Std. Dev.                  Min                 Max 
Regulatory variables ACTR 8.52 2.23 3 12 
 
CAPR 6.84 1.65 3 10 
 
SPR 11.07 2 7 16 
  PMON 8.72 1.25 6 11 
Notes: The table reports summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum) for the variables used in 
determining bank inefficiency. Units on the variables are activity restrictions, capital requirement, power of the supervisory 
agencies and private monitoring.  
 
    To examine the impact of the regulatory variables on inefficiency while controlling 
for country-specific characteristics, !"!" in Eq. (3) includes four regulatory variables 
such ACTR, CAPR and SPR, PMON. This information on regulations are obtained 
from database which is updated by Čihák et al (2012) in World Bank to provide 
regulatory responses to a broad of questions. While some missing data are estimated 
Table 1 
     
Summary statistics of the variables used in estimating bank inefficiency 
    
 
Variable  Mean St. dev. Min. Max. 
Variables used to estimate bank 
inefficiency Total cost (TC) 1.645 5.492 0.0005 72.89 
 
Price of labor (P1) 0.011 0.009 0.0002 0.147 
Price of financial capital (P2) 0.060 0.146 0.0001 4.740 
Net loan (Q1) 26.35 100.4 0.0005 1364.6 
Other earning assets (Q2) 23.06 126.7 0.001 2273.5 
Equity (N) 3.34 12.62 0.0033 179.4 
GDP per capital 
11506.
4 14245.42 1553.6 60800.9 
9	  
	  
in half value of each standard in terms of their national policy. !"!,! which is received 
from World Bank, is a variable to reflect the condition of institutional environment; 
Similarly, from World Development Indicators, we also obtain the variables of !!,! 
for controlling the macroeconomic environment while !!,!,!  in equation (2) is a 
control variables acquired from BankScope for representing individual bank 
characteristics.    
 
    ACTR indicates the level of restrictions on the banks’ activities. It can take values 
between 3 and 12 with higher values indicating higher restrictions. It includes three 
standards for evaluating the values such as securities, insurance and real estate 
activities, and it’s four levels for evaluating is unrestricted (=1), permitted (=2), 
restricted (=3) or prohibited (=4). Thus the final assessment for ACTR is the 
summation of the values of securities, insurance and real estate activities.  
 
    CAPR is an indicator of capital requirements, accounting for both overall and initial 
capital stringency. For the overall capital stringency, it determines whether the capital 
requirement reflects certain risk elements and deducts certain market value losses 
from capital before minimum capital adequacy. In the second stringency, it indicates 
whether certain funds may be used to initially capitalize a bank and whether they are 
officially. CAPR can take values between 0 and 10 with higher values, suggesting a 
greater stringent capital requirement.  
 
    SPR is a measure of the power of the supervisory agencies and its values with 
greater values indicates more power of supervisions. It is examined on the basis of the 
answers and the aim of this measurement is to discover whether the supervisory 
authorities have the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems. 
It also means to indicate whether supervisors can change the internal organizational 
structure of the bank and take some specific disciplinary action against bank 
management and directors, shareholders and bank auditors (Pasiouras et al 2009).   
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    PMON is an index of market discipline that takes values between 0 and 12. It 
indicates whether there incentives for the private monitoring of firms, with higher 
values indicating more private monitoring. This standard includes whether 
subordinated debt allowable as part of capital, whether off-balance sheet items are 
disclosed to public and whether bank regulators are required to make public formal 
enforcement actions, which include cease and desist orders and written agreements 
between a bank regulatory body and a banking organization. Thus, higher values 
suggest higher disclosure requirements and more incentives to increase private 
monitoring.     
                                                                                              
3.2.2 Institutional variables 
Table 3           
Summary statistics of the variables used in determining bank inefficiency 
 Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Institutional variables Governance effectiveness 0.25 0.74 -0.81 2.43 
 
Rule of law -0.01 0.79 -0.98 1.81 
 
Control of corruption -0.16 0.94 -1.13 2.42 
Notes: The table reports summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum) for the variables used in 
determining bank inefficiency. Units of the variables are institutional variables, such as political stability, governance 
effectiveness, rule of law and control of corruption.  
     
    Table 3 show the institional variables which is database coverd by Abiad et al 
(2010) who shows the new databse about institional environment. The variable in !"!,! in equation (3) corresponds to a number of indices which evaluate institutional 
quality in the countries examined. According to beck et al., (2006) and barth et al., 
(2009), we use three indexes obtained from World Bank to reflect institutional 
environment, such as governance effectiveness, rule of law and control of corruption. 
All of them take values between -2.5 and 2.5 with higher values reflecting greater 
institutional quality. For the governance effectiveness, it represents the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
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the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. The variable rule of 
law, in turn, reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence. It also means that it is an assessment of law quality, with higher values 
representing the greater quality of the judicial system but lower ratings indicating 
inferior enforcement. Finally, the variable control of corruption reflects perceptions of 
the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty 
and grand forms of corruption. Choosing this variable is relevant for our paper, due to 
corruption usually make markets less efficient and generates networking effects Delis 
(2012).  At the same time, the research of bect et al., (2006) also support this idea that 
strict supervision of corruption can increase transparency of a bank, which can bring 
positive effect on bank performance. Therefore, analyzing data of control of 
corruption is aiming to ensure a well institutional condition and prevent moral hazard.  
Similarly,  Lensink et al., (2008) indicate that the ono-high income countries about the 
impact pf foreign on efficiency depends on the quality of institutions, which means 
that the high quality of institutional envirornment positively affect efficiency of 
foreign banks. 
 
3.2.3 Control variables   
    Table 4 shows the control variables. In the equation (3), we control for a number of 
macroeconomic and bank-specific variables which can bring impact on the bank 
performance. Thus, for representing the macroeconomic environment and monetary 
conditions, we use variables GDP growth, inflation, domestic credit to private sector 
and unemployment rate as control variables which are obtained from World 
Development and International Monetary Fund indicators. Since all data are described 
in $US, the variable GDP growth, inflation and unemployment rate can represent 
countries’ characteristics respectively, while domestic credit to the private sector as a 
share of GDP represents the level of development of the financial sector.  
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Table 4           
Summary statistics of the variables used in determining bank inefficiency 
 
 
Institutional variables 
Variables  
 
Inflation % 
Mean 
 
5.12 
Std. Dev. 
 
0.04 
Min 
 
-3.06 
Max 
 
20.3 
 
GDP % 6.03 0.03 -5.53 14.78 
 
Unemployment rate % 5.89 2.48 0.66 11.83 
  Private sector credit (% of GDP) 77.67 52.06 16.9 219.28 
Bank-specific variables Bank Size 9.68 0.92 6.76 12.45 
 
Fee income 0.0065 0.003 0.0002 0.245 
 
Liquidity 0.22 0.16 0 0.96 
 
Non-performance loan 0.02 0.04 0 1.5 
  Equity to asset 0.11 0.09 0 0.85 
Notes: The table reports summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum) for the variables used in 
determining bank inefficiency. There are Macroeconomic variables and individual bank characteristic variables. Bank size is the 
log of variables while ratio of liquidity, ratio of fee income and non-performance to total asset are simple ratios. GDP growth, 
Private sector credit and inflation are in % terms. 
 
    The second control variables which are obtained from BankScope, are used for 
reflecting individual bank characteristics. We use the natural logarithm of total assets 
to represent bank size and the ratio of total equity to total assets to control bank 
capitalization. Delis (2012) points out that large and well-capitalized banks are 
probably able to have access to a cheaper source of funds, due to scale economies, 
informational asymmetries and moral hazard issues. Furthermore, large banks can 
play an effective role of institutions in enhancing effectiveness and may have a 
positive impact on cost efficiency. Therefore, this control variable can discover 
distinctly banks characteristics on the certain regulations. Additionally, the fee income 
which equals non-interest operating income divided by total assets, is considered as a 
control variable as well, because this difference may affect the pricing of loan 
products. Thus, the variable fee income is one of the main factors for assessing the 
impact of regulations, bank performance and institutions. In addition to, we use the 
ratio of liquid assets to total assets to represent bank liquidity for controlling the 
differences in bank assets. As can be seen that banks with high levels of liquid assets 
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in cash and government securities may receive lower interest income than banks with 
less liquid assets. We also choose the variable non-performance loan to total asset 
which is a proxy for default risk, to reflect individual banks’ characteristics as well. 
Finally, the ratio of equity to total asset used to determine the financial health and 
long-term profitability of a bank. Therefore, it may have a negative effect on cost 
efficiency because it may generate additional expenses, such as labor costs and 
storage costs.  
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Estimating Cost Inefficiency 
    In this study, we use the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) methodology to examine 
bank cost inefficiency. According to Aigner et al (1977), the main advantage of 
employing SFA approach is that both error and inefficiency are incorporated in a 
composite error term. This method allows us to estimate a global frontier while 
accounting for cross- country differences. The general model for examining the cost 
frontier can be written as follows:  
 ln!!,! = ! !!,!!!,!!!,!!!,! + !!,! + !!,!                            ! = 1,2,… ,!; ! = 1,2,… ,!                (1) 
 
    Where !!,! the total cost for bank ! at year !; !!,! is a vector of inputs; !!,! denotes a 
vector of values of outputs, !!,! is a vector of fixed netputs while !!,! is a vector of 
control variables. The term !!,! is symmetric error and represents that management of 
a bank cannot deal with this random fluctuation. !!,!  captures the effects of 
inefficiency relative to the stochastic cost frontier and it is assumed to be 
independently distributed in one-side, meaning that this effect has potential to 
enhance the costs of banks over the best-practice level. It is obvious that examining 
bank cost function requires the data on input prices instead of input quantities and the 
information on the extra cost of allocative inefficiency. We use the translog 
specification which results in an empirical cost frontier model:     
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ln!!,! = !! + !!! ln!!,! + !!! ln!!,! + 12 !!"!! ln!!,! ln!!,!+ 12 !!"!! ln!!,! ln!!,! + !!,!!! ln!!,! !!,! + !!! ln!!,!+ 12 !!,! ln!!,!!! ln!!,! + !!,!!! ln!!,! ln!!,! + !!! ln!!,!+ !!,! + !!,!                                                                                                                                                                                                        (2)   
    In terms of the cost frontier model, not only the restrictions of standard liner 
homogeneity and symmetry are imposed in our paper, but also we consider the time 
and country effects. As above-mentioned, concerning the specification of the efficient 
frontier, we decide the bank’s total cost (!), which is calculated as total expense (non-
interest expenses plus interest expenses), as the dependent variable. Thus, following 
Sealey and Lindley (1997), we choose two outputs which include loans (net of 
provisions) and other earning assets (government securities, bonds, investment, CDs 
and T-bills). Furthermore, consistent with previous studies of bank efficiency, we 
select the following two inputs: price of labor (!!) , calculated as the ratio of 
personnel expense to total assets; price of financial capital (!!), calculated as total 
interest expense to total interest bearing borrowed funds. As can be seen that equity is 
an alternative funding for a bank and it has potential to affect the bank’s cost. 
Following Berger and Mester (1997) idea, we use equity of each bank in the model as 
a fixed netput (!) to control for differences in risk preferences3. In analyzing the 
efficiency frontier in a cross-country sample is crucial to apply variables which can 
capture country-level heterogeneity so that GDP per capital may be an indicator of the 
dynamism of each economy.  
 
4.2 Determinants of inefficiency  
    This methodology of analysis uses the cost inefficiency scores to estimate the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
3 If shareholders have more capital at stake with higher equity capital, they may behave in more risk averse manner 
than firms with lower level of equity. Additionally, the constant value (equity) can make all bank’s profit to positive, 
because some banks may have negative profit.  
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impact of regulations and the quality of institutions in Asian 11 countries, using as 
control variables macroeconomic conditions and the bank characteristics. The general 
empirical model used to examine the relation between bank performance, regulations 
and institutions are the following: 
 !"#!!"!,! = !! + !!!"!" + !!!"!,! + !!!!,! + !!!!,!,!+ !!,!,!                                                                                                                                                               (3) 
 
    In this equation, !"#$$%!,!  which is calculated by the cost frontier model (the 
equation 2) is the value of the inefficiency of bank ! at time ! in country !; !"!" is the 
regulation variable, and measures the overall quality of supervision for financial 
markets in country ! at time !; !"!,! is a set of variables representing the conditions of 
the institutional environment in country ! at time !; !!,! is a set of variables reflecting 
the macroeconomic conditions in country !  at time ! ; !!,!,!  is a set of variables 
representing individual bank characteristics; and !!,!,! is the error item. We run the 
regressions by pooling OLS using robust standard errors4.  
 
4.3 The Dynamic Panel Model  
    For the sake of further examining the impact of regulations and institutions on the 
inefficiency of Asian banks, we use a dynamic panel model to eliminate the potential 
endogenous problem by employing instrumental variables. Therefore, we choose the 
Arellano and Bover (1995) approach to and the equation is following:  
 !"#$$%!,! = !! + !"#$$%!,!!! + !!!"!" + !!!"!,! + !!!!,! + !!!!,!,! + !!,!,!               (4) 
 
    In this equation, !"#$$%!,! is value of the inefficiency of bank ! at time ! in country 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
4 For analyzing the panel data, the two main methods are random effects and fixed effects but neither of them are 
considered appropriate for our analysis. It is clear that the use of fixed effects is a valid approach because we just 
focus on time-invariant controls in our regressions and we do test the robustness of results in order to control for 
heteroskedasticity.   
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! ; !"!"  is regulation variable; !"!,!  is a set of variables of  te institutional 
environment; !!,! is a vector of macroeconomic conditions in country ! at time !; !!,!,! is a set of bank specific variables; and !!,!,! is the error item.  
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Cost inefficiency estimates 
    Cost inefficiency estimations are presented in Table 5 and Table 6. They report the 
inefficiency scores on the cost frontier models by geographical region and year. Those 
scores display averages over the period 2000-2012 and through 11 countries. The 
Figure 1 in the appendix shows the result of the cost frontier model.  
Table 5 
        
Cost inefficiency estimates 
      
  
        No of oberve.                Cost inefficiency Min 
 
Max 
Country 
        
Australia  
 
121 
 
0.222 
 
0.092 
 
0.391 
China 
 
464 
 
0.211 
 
0.062 
 
0.613 
Hong Kong China 148 
 
0.245 
 
0.054 
 
0.552 
India 
 
531 
 
0.257 
 
0.055 
 
0.717 
Indonesia 437 
 
0.219 
 
0.055 
 
1.211 
Japan 
 
111 
 
0.277 
 
0.029 
 
1.998 
Sri Lanka 
 
31 
 
0.234 
 
0.092 
 
0.325 
Malaysia 
 
63 
 
0.268 
 
0.060 
 
1.000 
Philippines 214 
 
0.216 
 
0.064 
 
0.943 
Singapore 59 
 
0.299 
 
0.047 
 
1.621 
Thailand 
 
222 
 
0.231 
 
0.052 
 
1.021 
Notes: The results are calculated from the total sample, showing the cost inefficiency of each country. 
     
    The full sample overall mean cost efficiency score equals 0.23. It is not 
unreasonable that these banks need to improve by 23% to assess the cost efficiency 
frontier. According to the studies of Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) and Pasiouras et 
al., (2009), banks in Singapore and Japan have the largest cost inefficiency levels, 
with scores of 0.299 and 0.277 respectively, while banks in China have the best 
performance with inefficiency scores at about 0.211. Furthermore, banks in 
Philippines also are the second best performers with the scores around 0.219, meaning 
that they need to promote by 21.9% to be efficient. It is evident that China has a 
17	  
	  
majority of commercial and saving banks and locals likes to deposit their money 
according to their cultures and customs so that these banks can operate more efficient 
than that of other countries. In contrast, Japan and Singapore which are well-
developed, prone to establish investment banks to stimulate their economic evolution 
and thus their saving and commercial banks may not receive enough attention. 
 
Table 6 
        
Cost inefficiency estimates 
      
  
         No of oberve. 
               Cost 
inefficiency Min 
 
Max 
Mean by year 
       
2000 
 
50 
 
0.200 
 
0.060 
 
0.407 
2001 
 
74 
 
0.303 
 
0.155 
 
0.447 
2002 
 
80 
 
0.306 
 
0.135 
 
0.409 
2003 
 
95 
 
0.250 
 
0.117 
 
1.021 
2004 
 
130 
 
0.213 
 
0.099 
 
0.469 
2005 
 
165 
 
0.220 
 
0.052 
 
0.347 
2006 
 
196 
 
0.251 
 
0.103 
 
0.467 
2007 
 
207 
 
0.244 
 
0.092 
 
0.635 
2008 
 
223 
 
0.239 
 
0.070 
 
0.411 
2009 
 
246 
 
0.207 
 
0.066 
 
0.490 
2010 
 
273 
 
0.198 
 
0.061 
 
0.278 
2011 
 
331 
 
0.225 
 
0.067 
 
0.257 
2012 
 
328 
 
0.230 
 
0.073 
 
0.291 
Overall mean 2398 
 
0.230 
 
0.088 
 
0.456 
Notes: The results indicate the mean of the cost inefficiency of each year between 2000 and 2012.  
 
    In terms of time series in Table 6, there is a better bank performance in 2000 in 
Asian countries, but this trend shows increasing cost inefficiency levels at the mean 
after that. However, it peaks at higher scores with 0.306 in 2002, which can be 
explained by the challenges faced by Asian countries of more competitive 
environment as some foreign banks' entry. During 2003 to 2005, it shows a decreasing 
tendency before it rises to a higher level in 2006 which can be explained that the 
global financial crisis was gradually shaped so that Asian banks may cannot work 
effectively as usual.  Whereas during the time of 2007-2010, it maintains a relatively 
decreasing tendency, meaning that envisaging the economic disaster, customers prefer 
to deposit money into commercial banks and saving rather than invest in financial 
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markets. Nevertheless, during the period 2011-2012, the scores increase constantly 
and reach at 0.23 which may be influenced by a new publication of regulations. All in 
all, during the period of 2000 and 2012, these ups and downs may be also caused by 
announcement of new regulations.  
 
5.2 Determinants of inefficiency 
5.21 The relationship between inefficiency and regulations 
    Table 7 shows the estimation of the influence of regulation on bank inefficiency 
and this model includes macroeconomic environment as well as bank specific 
variables. Furthermore, we analyze the impact of regulations on bank performance 
during the period 2000-2012 and investigate the four standards of the regulations.   
 
    In terms of the macroeconomic control variables, the variables of private sector 
credit(%) are significant at the 1% level of each model and have a negative impact on 
cost inefficiency, which means that this indicator can improve bank performance. 
However, almost all banks-specific variable coefficients are not really significant. As 
can be seen that for the first column, ACTR has a statistically negative impact on cost 
inefficiency, implying that higher restrictions of activities increase the cost efficiency 
of banks. This is consistent with the view that more regulations restrict banks to entry 
securities, insurance and real estate markets in order to protect banks from facing 
more risks. This negative impact also indicates that the lower cost may allow banks to 
utilize their funding sources more effectively and ensure the stable operation of Asian 
banks. On the other hand, because of higher restrictions on the bank's activities, banks 
may cut down their expenditures to acquire less expertise and specialization in 
financial markets, and thus they have improved cost efficiency.  
 
    Similarly, in the second column, CAPR has a significant negative impact on cost 
efficiency, showing that lower (higher) capital requirement result in higher (lower) 
cost inefficiency. As the study of Pasiouras et al., (2006) restrictive capital 
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requirements may lead to high level of bank capital so that there is low probability of 
financial distress. Furthermore, a higher capital requirement can restrict bank to 
engaging in higher risk activities and ensure a stable bank's performance. Therefore, 
banks with high capital requirement can envisage low risk and exhibit high efficiency. 
 
Table 7 
        
The relationship between inefficiency and regulations 
   
  
Cost inefficiency Cost inefficiency Cost inefficiency Cost inefficiency 
Inflation %  -0.806 
 
-0.124 
 
0.072 
 
-0.058 
  
(-0.77) 
 
(-1.11) 
 
(-0.70) 
 
(-0.60) 
GDP % 
 
 
-0.20 
   
-0.138 
 
-0.111 
  
     (-2.32)** 
   
(-1.68)* 
 
(-1.32) 
Private sector credit (% 
of GDP) 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.002 
  
(-6.38)*** 
 
(-6.06)*** 
 
(-4.44)*** 
 
(-6.52)*** 
Unemployment rate % 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.005 
 
0.002 
 
-0.004 
  
(-0.90) 
 
 (-2.21)** 
 
(-0.12) 
 
(-1.93)* 
Bank Size 
 
0.003 
 
0.010 
 
-0.003 
 
0.021 
  
(0.13) 
 
(0.49) 
 
(-0.18) 
 
(1.20) 
Fee income  0.006 
 
0.004 
 
0.003 
 
0.002 
  
(0.29) 
 
(0.21) 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.08) 
Liquidity 
 
0.121 
 
0.12 
 
0.104 
 
0.081 
  
(2.06)** 
 
(1.94)* 
 
(1.78)* 
 
(1.39) 
Non-performance loan -0.056 
 
-0.053 
 
-0.066 
 
-0.073 
  
(-0.44) 
 
(-0.42) 
 
(-0.53) 
 
(-0.59) 
Equity to asset 0.032 
 
0.036 
 
0.009 
 
0.055 
  
(0.26) 
 
(0.29) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.45) 
ACTR 
 
-0.006 
      
  
(-3.24)*** 
      CAPR 
   
-0.004 
    
    
(-1.78)* 
    SPR 
     
-0.014 
  
      
(-5.62)*** 
  PMON 
       
-0.017 
        
(-5.77)*** 
         
R-sq 
 
0.077 
 
0.071 
 
0.097 
 
0.102 
P-value 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
Notes: The table presents coefficients and t-statistics for the relationship between inefficiency and regulations. The dependent 
variable in columns is cost inefficiency scores. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% 
level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level.     
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    For the third and fourth columns, there is significant negative impact on cost 
inefficiency caused by SPR and PMON. The effect of official supervisory action 
indicates that higher scores may give rise to greater cost efficiency, meaning that 
powerful supervision can improve the corporate governance of banks and their 
functioning (Beck et al., 2006). It is not unreasonable that supervisory authorities who 
have the ability to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems, can promote 
bank performance and efficiency. Similarly, the effect of PMON suggests that higher 
PMON can drive banks to work more effectively. This impact related to disclosure of 
accurate information to the public will allow private agents to mitigate asymmetric 
information (Beck et al., 2006 and Pasiouras et al., 2009). Obviously, as the 
information discovering to public, the moral hazard and corruption of bank officials 
will be reduced. Therefore, more private monitoring of banks may improve their 
functioning and increase cost efficiency.  
 
    According to the above results, it is evident that regulations have a significant 
impact on bank behaviors, which is lined with our hypothesis. Our results also support 
some early studies such as Barth et al., (2004), Demirgüç-Kunt et al (2008) and 
Pasiouras et al., 2009, that ACTR, CAPR, SPR and PMON have dramatically positive 
impact on bank efficiency, meaning that greater restrictions of these regulations can 
force banks to work at a higher level of efficiency. In conclusion, these significant 
results determine that bank performance is definitely improved by regulations.     
 
 
5.22 The relationship between inefficiency and institutions 
    Table 8 shows the estimation of the influence of the institutional environment on 
bank inefficiency and this model includes macroeconomic environment as well as 
bank specific variables. Moreover, we analyze the impact of institutions on bank 
performance during the period 2000-2012 and investigate the three standards of 
institutional variables respectively.   
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Table 8 
       The relationship between inefficiency and institutions 
  
   
Cost inefficiency Cost inefficiency Cost inefficiency 
ACTR 
  
-0.004 
 
-0.004 
 
    -0.004 
   
    (-2.40)* 
 
     (-2.28)**        (-3.12)*** 
SPR 
  
-0.009 
 
-0.009 
 
         -0.01 
   
    (-4.04)***      (-4.20)***        (-5.21)*** 
PMON 
  
-0.124 
 
-0.012 
 
       -0.113 
   
    (-4.40)***      (-4.15)***        (-4.42)*** 
Private sector credit (% of GDP) -0.013 
 
-0.001 
 
        -0.001 
   
    (-4.17)***      (-5.01)***        (-5.93)*** 
Bank Size 
  
0.004 
 
0.007 
  
   
(0.19) 
 
(0.37) 
  Liquidity 
  
0.086 
 
0.083 
 
     0.077 
   
(1.43) 
 
(1.40) 
 
       (3.33)*** 
Non-performance loan -0.081 
 
-0.083 
  
   
       (-0.65)        (-0.67) 
 GDP % 
  
-0.155 
 
-0.114 
 
     -0.111 
   
     (-1.85)*        (-1.54)        (-1.34) 
Inflation % 
 
0.067 
 
-0.019 
 
     -0.173 
   
      (-0.71) 
 
       (-0.18)         (-1.78)* 
Unemployment rate % 
  
-0.003 
  
     
       (-1.14) 
 Governance effectiveness 0.052 
    
   
       (1.41) 
    Control of corruption 
  
0.023 
  
     
(-0.89) 
  Rule of law 
     
     -0.064 
       
        (-2.37)** 
  R-sq                         
 
0.118 
 
0.117 
 
       0.112 
P-value 
  
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
       0.000 
Notes: The table presents coefficients and t-statistics for the relationship between inefficiency and institutions. The dependent 
variable in columns is cost inefficiency scores. Since the institutional variables have correlation relationship, we run the fixed 
effect separately. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at 
the 10% level.  
 
    According to Table 8, the macroeconomic variable such as private sector credit(%of 
GDP) are statistically significant at the 5% and unveil a negative impact on bank 
performance. In the third column, three regulation variables show an statistically 
significant as the 1% level, and exerts a negative effect on inefficiency in line with 
previous results in the Table 8, which further confirms that regulations can strongly 
affect bank performance. With the negative effect of regressor of private sector credit 
(% of GDP), the institutional variable of rule of law shows a significant and negative 
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effect on inefficiency. In the Lensink et al (2008) opinion, the quality of the rule of 
law can affect the cost efficiency through the effectiveness and predictability of the 
judiciary. Apparently, since the strict law may pave a normative way for financial 
firms to walk, banks may just follow the law which may reduce redundant and 
complicated procedure. Thus, combining regulatory effect, the rule of law may 
generate a positive impact on bank performance.  
 
    Consequently, through combining above significant result of rule of law and early 
studies of Demirgüç-Kunt et al (2008) and Delis, M., (2012), we support our 
hypothesis that the institutions have significant impact on bank performance. 
Furthermore,  the institutional variable of rule of law displays dramatically negative 
impact on bank inefficiency so that rigorous law is able to enhance bank efficiency. 
The following section will further examine our results and eliminate the endogenous 
problems.  
6. Endogeneity  
    So far, our results indicate the existence of close relations between bank 
performance, regulations and institutions. However, it does not mean that the results 
are perfect because there may exist potential endogeneity. Therefore,  an important 
feature of this analysis is that we account for potential endogeneity of inefficiency. It 
is quite certain that implementing conspicuous regulations can restrict bank activity 
and influence their performance. However, reverse causality could arise, for example, 
when banking industry was a lower efficiency and even face financial crisis, which 
may render the policy maker to modify and draft items of regulation. For addressing 
the likely endogeneity of cost inefficiency, we employ an instrumental variable 
technique with a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. A common 
problem in using empirical data is autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, and we 
eliminate their impact using fixed effect with robust at Table 7 and 8. When facing 
heteroskedasticity and endogeneity problems, the GMM estimator introduced by 
Hansen (1982) may be more efficient than 2SLS.  
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    We use regulatory variables such as ACTR, CAPR, SPR and PMON, and cost 
inefficiency as instruments in the analysis for dealing with endogenous problem. 
Activity restrictions, capital requirement, power of supervisions and private 
monitoring are key determinants for the scope of operations of banks and are likely to 
affect the level of inefficiency. These indexes provide information as to whether banks 
can engage in securities, insurance, and real estate activities, and indicate whether 
certain funds may be used to initially capitalize a bank, and whether supervisors can 
change the internal organizational structure of the bank, and whether off-balance sheet 
items are disclosed to public. Additionally, banking inefficiency represents an 
indicator for determining whether the bank’s operation can reach an efficient level. 
We test for the relevance of these instruments or the endogeneity of cost inefficiency 
using the Arellano-Bond test which estimates whether exist autocorrelation, and 
Hansen test which replaces Sargan test to reveal whether the instruments are not valid. 
 
    The results in Table 9 show that the regulation variables CAPR is  significant at the 
10% level and the variable (SPR) is statistically significant at the level of 1% and 
PMON is significant at the 5% level. In the first column, the variable ACTR is 
statistically significant at the level of 1%, while that in the third column is significant 
at the 10% level. The ACTR, CAPR, SPR and PMON exhibit a negative effect on 
inefficiency. These results remain robust in line with previous research on the Table 9, 
meaning that the regulations have a strong effect on bank performance. Additionally, 
the dynamic analysis does mainly confirm the static fixed effects results in relation to 
the impact of regulations on bank inefficiency. Therefore, through utilizing the 
dynamic panel model, we deal with the endogenous problem and support our 
hypothesis that regulations have a positive effect on bank performance, meaning that 
restrictive supervision can enhance bank efficiency. Therefore, the significant impact 
of regulations on bank efficiency support our idea that activity restriction (ACTR), 
capital requirement (CAPR), power of the supervisory agency (SPR) and private 
monitoring (PMON) can improve bank performance. 
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Table 9  
        
The relationship between cost inefficiency and regulations 
   
Dependent variable :  Cost Inefficiency  Cost Inefficiency  Cost Inefficiency  Cost Inefficiency 
lag inefficiency 0.595 
 
0.606 
 
0.606 
 
0.561 
  
(8.40)*** 
 
(8.10)*** 
 
(8.10)*** 
 
(7.66)*** 
ACTR 
 
-0.005 
   
-0.002 
  
  
(-3.73)*** 
   
(-1.66)* 
  
CAPR 
   
-0.003 
 
-0.003 
 
0.003 
    
(-1.89)* 
 
(-1.90)* 
 
(-1.10) 
SPR 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.005 
  
  
(-3.56)*** 
 
(-2.58)*** 
 
(-2.68)*** 
  
PMON 
       
-0.007 
        
              (-2.34)** 
Liquidity 
 
0.084 
 
0.071 
 
0.071 
  
  
(1.65)* 
 
(1.75)* 
 
(1.85)* 
  
PSC (% of GDP) -0.0005 
 
-0.0004 
 
-0.0004 
 
-0.00003 
  
(-3.13)*** 
 
(-2.89)*** 
 
(-2.32)*** 
 
(-0.16) 
Inflation % -0.169 
 
-0.141 
 
-0.141 
 
-0.015 
  
(-2.08)*** 
 
(-1.98)** 
 
(-1.99)** 
 
(-0.16) 
Bank 
Size 
 
0.011 
 
0.016 
 
0.016 
 
-0.006 
  
(1.22) 
 
(2.18)** 
 
(2.30)** 
 
(-0.45) 
Non-performance loan -0.009 
 
0.067 
 
0.067 
 
-0.256 
  
(-0.03) 
 
(1.03) 
 
(1.03) 
 
(-0.76) 
Equity to asset -0.288 
 
-0.046 
 
-0.046 
 
-0.51 
  
(-2.06)** 
 
(-0.90) 
 
(-0.90) 
 
(-2.96)*** 
Unemployment rate 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.001 
    
(-1.66)* 
 
(-1.76)* 
 
(-0.61) 
GDP % 
 
-0.099 
      
  
(-1.18) 
      
Hansen (p-value) 0.513 
 
0.878 
 
0.978 
 
0.617 
Notes: The relationships between bank performance and regulations. This table shows bank-level GMM regressions with robust 
standard errors. The dependent variable is the cost inefficiency, which is used to reflect bank's performance; a lower value 
illustrates greater bank performance. The explanatory variables are regulatory and bank-specific banks. The Arellano-Bond test 
for autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The Hansen’s J statistic tests the validity of the instruments used, 
and rejection implies that the instruments are not valid. The variable of PSC is private sector credit (% of GDP). ***Statistical 
significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% level     
 
    Apparently, according to the Table 10, the results in the first column suggest that 
the indicator of governance effectiveness has a dramatically negative effect on cost 
inefficiency at the level of 5%, and thus authority effectiveness can enhance bank 
efficiency. Since this element reflects the quality of public services and the civil 
service, the quality of policy implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
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commitment, strong government performance can generate higher efficient service 
and high quality of infrastructure which may force banks to polish their operation in 
order to satisfy people demand and reach national standard. Additionally, taking an 
example of China, their policy maker has enough power to drive the whole country to 
develop at top speed within 30 years, meanwhile their commercial and saving banks, 
which are almost controlled by government, can utilize tons of deposit to stimulate 
evolution of financial market because of governmental force and effectiveness. 
Therefore, there definitely has an influence from government in fostering bank 
efficiency.   
 
    In the second column, three regulatory variables have a significant negative impact 
on bank inefficiency, meanwhile the institutional variable of control of corruption has 
a dramatic negative impact on inefficiency at the level of 5%. It is evident that bribery 
usually generates less efficient market and give rise to networking effects, which may 
lead to some non-transparent transactions. Therefore, the high value of control of 
corruption can restrain the moral hazard and excessive patronage in order to 
normalize the right of managers. Furthermore, this practice may reduce the private 
deal and suspicious connection between politics and business. Therefore, bank 
efficiency can be enhanced by control of corruption.  Additionally, there is a 
significantly negative effect between bank inefficiency and rule of law in the third 
column, meaning that restrictive law can improve bank performance. It is certain that 
the rigorous law can safeguard the regulations surrounding in an efficient way and a 
high quality of the judicial system can support help government to ensure a stable 
banking industry.  
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Table 10 
      
Determinants of cost inefficiency 
   
Dependent variable :  Cost Inefficiency  Cost Inefficiency  Cost Inefficiency 
lag inefficiency 0.622 
 
0.611 
 
0.612 
  
(-9.32)*** 
 
(8.60)*** 
 
(9.55)*** 
ACTR 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.001 
  
(-1.65)* 
 
(-2.51)** 
 
(-1.58) 
CAPR 
 
-0.001 
   
-0.0003 
  
(-1.38) 
   
(-0.46) 
SPR 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.003 
  
(-2.49)** 
 
(-1.87)* 
 
(-3.68)*** 
PMON 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.002 
  
(-1.36) 
 
(-2.48)** 
 
(-1.68)* 
Liquidity 
 
0.010 
 
0.029 
 
0.007 
  
(0.67) 
 
(1.76)* 
 
0.48 
PSC (% of GDP) -0.0001 
 
-0.0002 
 
-0.0001 
  
(-2.27)** 
 
(-2.71)** 
 
(-2.27)** 
Inflation % -0.055 
 
-0.052 
 
-0.060 
  
(-1.59) 
 
(-1.61) 
 
(-1.65)* 
GDP % 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.019 
 
-0.004 
  
(-0.13) 
 
(-0.53) 
 
(-0.12) 
Bank Size 
 
0.007 
 
0.008 
 
0.001 
  
(2.42)** 
 
(2.12)* 
 
(0.11) 
Non-performance loan 0.057 
 
-0.012 
 
0.035 
  
(0.49) 
 
(-0.09) 
 
(0.30) 
Equity to asset -0.069 
 
-0.084 
 
-0.097 
  
(-1.35) 
 
(-1.61) 
 
(-2.13)** 
Governance effectiveness -0.019 
    
  
(-2.35)** 
    
Control of corruption 
 
-0.017 
  
    
(-2.48)** 
  
Rule of law 
    
-0.018 
      
                    (-1.70)* 
Hansen (p-value) 0.100 
 
0.969 
 
0.100 
Notes: The relationships between bank performance, regulations and institutions. This table shows bank-level GMM regressions 
with robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the cost inefficiency, which is used to reflect bank's performance; a lower 
value illustrates greater bank performance. The explanatory variables are regulatory, institutional and bank-specific banks. The 
Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation has a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The Hansen’s J statistic tests the validity of the 
instruments used, and rejection implies that the instruments are not valid. The variable of PSC is private sector credit (% of 
GDP). ***Statistical significance at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. *Statistical significance at the 10% 
level. 
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    As a result, institutional variables have significant coefficients at the 5% and 10% 
level respectively, which supports our hypothesis that institutions have a positive 
impact on bank performance and improve bank efficiency. The powerful governance, 
lower corruption and restrictive law can ensure a wholesome circumstance to 
implement effective regulations so that regulations can further improve bank 
performance in a soundness environment. Running the regression with robust 
specifies that the resulting standard errors are consistent with panel-specific 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Furthermore, according to the Hansen test, the 
instruments are valid and the results have vanished the endogenous and exogenous 
problem.      
7. Conclusion  
    This is the first study showing the interaction between inefficiency, regulations and 
institutions in the banking industry of 11 Asian countries. This paper provides 
theoretical and empirical analysis consisting 2398 observations from 409 commercial 
and saving banks, covering the period of 2000-2012. Through discussing the conflicts 
of the impact of regulations in early literature, we focused on the relationship between 
bank performance and regulations related to three pillars of Basel?  (capital 
requirement, power of supervisors and private monitoring) and restrictions on bank 
activities.  
    For estimating of inefficiency, we established parametric methods (stochastic 
frontier analysis) to set up inefficiency examination and these scores are used in both 
static and dynamic panel data models to discover the impact of regulations and 
institutions on bank performance. There are four indexes constituting regulations such 
as activity restrictions (ACTR), capital requirement (CAPR), power of supervisors 
(SPR) and private monitoring (PMON), meanwhile the variables of governance 
effectiveness, rule of law and control of corruption composite institutional 
environment index. There also combine bank-specific and macroeconomic controlling 
variables.  
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    Our results illustrate that more restrictions on bank activities, higher power of 
supervisory agency and more transparent private monitoring can enhance bank 
efficiency. First of all, strict restriction of bank engaging, diverse activities can reduce 
the conflicts of interest with their fundamental business and risk from various 
activities. Similarly, the high level of capital requirement can enhance bank efficiency 
by reducing the probability of financial crisis and risk. Furthermore, powerful 
supervisors can supervise the bank’s situation more accurately and enforce bank to 
report their information timely, which may help banks to avoid the market crisis by 
effectively regulating and disciplining. Additionally, the greater private monitoring 
can help supervisors to conduct surveillance to bank effectively and allow them to 
intervene if necessary. For the institutional variables, governance effectiveness, rule of 
law and control of corruption have positive impact on bank performance due to they 
are the basis to guarantee a stable environment in the banking industry.   
Overall, this paper utilizes Asian evidence to support that regulations and 
institutional environment can enhance bank operating performance. Through 
discussing with earlier studies and giving empirical investigation, we support the 
consensus that specific regulations can influence bank performance under certain 
institutional environment. Our study also highlights the characteristic of bank 
regulations and institutional environment that helps improve bank efficiency, which 
may be valuable for both academic and policy makers to explore what determine bank 
efficiency.   
Therefore, policy makers should enhance the level of restriction on bank’s activities, 
which meaning that government should prevent banks from participating in securities, 
insurance and esate activities. Furthermore, the quantity of capital requirement of 
banks should be increased by authority, which can reduce the probability of defualt 
risk. The great power of supervisory agencies and private monitoring, moreover, are 
able to improve banks efficiency because strict supervision and higer disclosure 
requirement may improve the management of banks. Finally, policy makers should 
29	  
	  
not only focus on standard of regulations, but also need to refine the institional 
environment. According to the results, government should improve the quality of vivil 
service and credibility of authority, meanwhile, rigid law which is corner stone for 
higher quality of institions may provide foundation for setting effective regulation. In 
a similar way, reducing corruption can reflect the power of government and improve 
transparency, which is a base of great government effectiveness by improving the 
credibility of authority.  
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Appendix: 
Figure 1 
      
Cost frontier model 
     
Dependent variables: 
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Notes: This figure shows the cost frontier model which is used to predict inefficiency. Q1 is loans (net of provisions) and Q2 is other earning 
assets (government securities, bonds, investment, CDs and T-bills).  P1 is price of labor and P2 is price of financial capital. We use equity of 
each bank in the model as a fixed netput (N) to control for differences in risk preferences and Z is control variables. ***Statistical significance 
at the 1% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level.  
 
 
 
